|
BY THE AUTHOR
Dr. W. Robert Cook, Th.D
Absolute
sovereignty is what I love to ascribe to God.
But my first conviction was not so.
The first instance that I remember
of that sort of inward, sweet delight in God
and divine things that I have lived much in since,
was on reading those words, 1 Tim. 1:17.
Now unto the King eternal, immortal, invisible,
the only wise God,
be honor and glory forever and ever, Amen.
As I read the words, there came into my soul,
and was as it were diffused through it,
a sense of the glory of the Divine Being;
a new sense, quite different from anything I ever experienced before.
Never any words of scripture seemed to me as these words did.
I thought within myself, how excellent a being that was,
and how happy I should be, if I might enjoy that God
and be wrapt up in heaven,
and be as it were swallowed up in him forever!
I kept saying, and as it were singing over these words of scripture to myself;
and went to pray to God that I might enjoy him,
and prayed in a manner quite different from what I used to do;
with a new sort of affection.
Jonathon Edwards (1703-1758)
No truth in all the theological encyclopedia has been more misunderstood, misstated, feared and vilified than the one we shall consider in this chapter. And yet, when properly understood, none holds more promise, encouragement and hope. If God is all wise and is sovereign, and even to consider anything else is to enthrone the absurd, then he must have a decree. If he has a decree, being truthful, loving and holy as he is, we may be confident that whether we understand it fully or not his plan for us involves good to the highest power. Rejoice with me that, ''In (Christ) also we have received an inheritance, having been predestined according to his purpose who works all things after the counsel of his will, to the end that we who before hoped in Christ should be to the praise of his glory" (Eph. 1:11-12).
Nonetheless, problems there are, and A. A. Hodge, writing more than one hundred years ago stated it well when he said,
What is the essential nature and source of the difficulties which oppress the human reason when speculating on this subject?
These difficulties all have their ground in the perfectly inscrutable relations of the eternal to the temporal, of the infinite to the finite, of God’s absolute sovereignty to man's free agency, and of the unquestionable fact of the origination of sin to the holiness, goodness, wisdom, and power of God. They are peculiar to no system of theology, but press equally upon any system which acknowledges the existence and moral government of God, and the moral agency of man. They have perplexed heathen philosophers of old and deists in modern times, and Socinians, Pelagians, and Arminians just as sorely as Calvinists. [1]
I. A Definition of the Decree
As a beginning definition of the decree, as understood in this work, we use that set forth by the Westminster Shorter Catechism. "The decree of God is His eternal purpose according to the counsel of His own will whereby for His own glory He has foreordained whatsoever comes to pass."
At first glance it may seem that such a statement views God as being under some bond of necessity which robs him of all freedom and depersonalizes his relationship to his creation. No such idea is intended, however, nor is it allowed in light of biblical revelation. Thiessen is correct in affirming that
The decrees originate in God’s freedom (Ps. 135:6; Eph. 1:11). He is not obligated to purpose any thing ad extra, but purposes unconstrainedly, if he purposes at all. The only necessity laid upon him in this respect is the necessity that comes from his own attributes as a wise and holy God. We, therefore, can know only by a special revelation from God whether or not he has purposed anything ad extra and, if he has, what it is that he has purposed. [2]
This means that what God has decreed, whether in the natural creation or in the new creation, was neither by eternal compulsion nor internal caprice. All he does is purposeful.
God creates neither by logical nor volitional nor external necessity; he was free not to decree a universe. The God who decrees from eternity remains free in that he himself is un-necessitated by any external causal principle; his compulsion to decree is entirely a matter of internal self-determination. But this internal compulsion does not govern God’s productive activity as a kind of deterministic divine causality … the bottom line for Christianity is always that God’s decrees imply no limitation on his powers ….” [3]
For this reason, so as to acknowledge the freedom of God and to avoid misunderstanding, our working definition will be, The decree of God is his eternal purpose according to the counsel of his own will whereby according to his own pleasure and for his own glory he has foreordained whatsoever comes to pass.
II. Scriptural Terms Related to the Decree
A. Purpose (prothesis) Eph. 1:9, 11; Rom. 8:28; 9:11; 2 Tim. 1:9
God does not act arbitrarily but according to a fixed plan.
B. Counsel (boule) Acts 2:23; Eph. 1:11; Heb. 1:17; Acts 4:28
This term views God's will as based on counsel and deliberation, but in a non-chronological setting. Thus it is counsel and deliberation in the sense of the bringing to bear of infinite wisdom.
C. Foreknowledge (prognosis) 1 Pet. 1:2; Acts 2:23; Rom. 8:29; 11:2
When used of God it means certain knowledge based on certain loving choice (with emphasis upon affections).
D. Election (ekloge) 1 Thess. 1:4; Matt. 22:14, Rom. 9:11; 11:5; 1 Cor. 1;27-28; Eph. 1;4; 1 Pet. 1:2; 2 Pet. 1:10
Selection; choice; it is always used of divine choice in the New Testament. It shows that God's will does not include all in salvation. Cf. also Acts 13148; Rom. 8:33J 2 Thess. 2113.
E. Predestine; foreordain; (proorismos, prooridzo) Rom. 8:29-30; Acts 4:28; 1 Cor. 2:7; Eph. 1:5, 11.
In the abstract it means to mark out by boundaries beforehand (with emphasis on will). When used of the elect it refers to God's extra-temporal purposing for their good.
F. Will (thelema) Eph. 1:1
This is a general term emphasizing the volitional rather than the deliberative aspect of will.
G. Good pleasure (eudokia) Lu. 2:14, Eph. 1:5, 9; Phil. 2:13
Emphasizes the freedom of God’s purpose and the delight with which it is accompanied. As Henry reminds us, the biblical use of this term “… cancels any notion of a mechanically necessary connection between God ...” [4] and his freely chosen acts of creation and redemption.
III. Lines of Evidence for the Decree
In biblical theology the concept of a decree is inescapable. God does nothing apart from his decree. This is established in both Old and New Testament by specific biblical assertion as well as by reasonable inferences. “In the Old Testament presentation, the planning and ordaining work of God is very much tied up with the covenant which the Lord made with his people." [5] He is presented not only as the originator of Israel but also as the one who faithfully and lovingly sustains and cares for them. Furthermore, “For the Old Testament writers, it was virtually inconceivable that anything could happen independently of the will and working of God" (ibid., p. 348). Nothing was viewed as simply happening. All was seen as taking place according to plan by the God who planned it. This was true whether it involved the elements (1 Kings 18:41-45, cf. James 5:17-18), the affairs of heathen nations (Isa. 37:26), or the welfare of his people (Ps 37:1-40). There was no question that what he had purposed would be fulfilled (Isa. 46:10-11). “As a result, the prophets could speak of coming events with certainty. Future events could be prophesied because God had planned them, and his plan would surely come to fruition." [6]
This viewpoint is continued in the New Testament. Our Lord lived his earthly life with a sense of fulfilling God’s purpose (e.g., Luke 2:49; John 4:34. John repeatedly reminds his readers that Jesus' life and ministry unfolded according to God’s plan (e.g. John 7:30; 8:20); Peter does the same in Acts 2:23 and 1 Peter 1:20; while Paul's writings are permeated with the teaching that all things (Eph. 1:11) are included in the divine purpose.
A. Specific Statements of Scripture
1. All things are included in the decree
Isa. 14:26-27; 46:10-11; Dan. 4:35; Eph. 1:11.
2. Special things and events are included
Examples of some of the special things are the stability of the physical universe (Ps. 119:89-91); the circumstances of nations (Acts 17:26); the length of human life (Job 14:5); the mode of our death (John 21:19); and the free acts of men, including both good acts (Isa. 44:28; Eph. 2:10) and evil acts (Gen. 50:20; Luke 22:22; Acts 2:23; 4;27-28; Rom. 9:17, Rev. 17:17).
3. Spiritual things are included
Such things as salvation of believers (1 Cor. 2:7; Eph. 3:10-11), the establishment of the kingdom of God (Ps. 2:7-8); and the work of Christ and his people in establishing it (Phil. 2:12-13; Rev. 5:1, 7, 10) are also a part of the decree.
B. Reasonable Inferences from Scripture
A. H. Strong points out that there are also certain biblical inferences regarding the essence and activity of God that call for belief in a decree.
1. The nature of God
If there is anybody or anything other than God that is absolutely free, referring to will, you do not have a sovereign God. The idea of absolute freedom in any other being not only destroys the concept of a sovereign God it destroys the very concept of sovereignty altogether. His attributes, combining to constitute his ineffable person and nature, require a decree. How, for example, can he be omniscient if he does not know the plan of the ages and how can there be a plan if it has not been decreed? If there is a plan there must be a decree which renders it certain.
Note that:
a) Divine foreknowledge implies fixity which implies a decree (the idea of contingent divine foreknowledge is nonsense since it puts God in the position of not knowing rather than knowing. The only things that can be foreknown are things that are to be known; and things that are, call for fixity);
b) Divine wisdom operates according to divine plan, that is if it is divine wisdom it is ordered rather than ad hoc;
c) Divine immutability indicates that there can be no increase in power or knowledge, again ruling out the possibility of contingency as well as the possibility of mistakes;
d) Divine benevolence requires that both the course and end of history be determined by God’s will rather than by chance or the creatures will; and
e) The fact that God is eternal indicates that his purpose is likewise eternal (see Eph. 3:11, for example), that is it is separated from the vicissitudes of time.
2. The works of God
Creation, providence, and redemption speak of a decree or else things would not be coming to pass as they are. The above cited attributes of God indicate that his temporal working in providence must proceed according to his eternal purpose. Since this providential governing of God is eternal it is unitary and thus comprehends all things in the universe as a whole as well as every particular in detail. See Prov. 16:33; Dan. 4:34-35; Matt. 10:29-30.
IV. The Nature of the Decree
A. The Ground of the Decree
God’s Grace, love and good pleasure is the ground of the decree. Matt. 11:25-26; Luke 12:32; Eph. 1:5-6, 9; Rom. 9:21. It arises solely and completely from within the divine nature.
B. Characteristics of the Decree
1. It is eternal and unitary, Eph. 1:4; 2 Tim. 1:9; 1 Pet. 1:20; Eph. 3:11; 1 Cor. 2:7.
That is, it lies entirely in eternity. Thus the order in which its elements stand to each other is logical not chronological (temporal). There is no before and after within eternity.
There is, of course, logical sequence (e.g., the decision to let Jesus die on the cross logically follows the decision to send him to the earth), and there is a temporal sequence in the enacting of the events which have been decreed; but there is no temporal sequence to God's willing. It is one coherent simultaneous decision. [7]
If his purpose is eternal it is one, by necessity, that is, it is all immediate to him rather than some now and some later. All events with their interrelations are within one decree. The effect of one Cause becomes the cause of another effect. No event is isolated and if one event is decreed all other events must therefore be determined with it. [8]
The unitary character of the decree leads us to speak of a decree rather than decrees. Because of the limitation of the human mind and the infinite nature of God’s purposes what in reality is one (see e.g., Rom. 8:28; Eph 1:11) appears to us as many.
As our minds are finite, as it is impossible for us to embrace in one act of intelligent comprehension an infinite number of events in all their several relations and bearings, we necessarily contemplate events in partial groups, and we conceive of the purpose of God relating to them as distinct successive acts. Hence the Scriptures speak of the counsels, the purposes, and the judgments of god in the plural, and in order to indicate the intended relation of one event to another, they represent God as purposing one event, as the means or condition upon which another is suspended. This is all true because these events do have these relations to one another, but they all alike fall within, and none remain without, that one eternal design of God which comprehends equally all causes and effects, all events and all conditions.[9]
2. It is wise, Rom. 11:33; Eph. 3:10-11; Ps. 104:24.
By its nature it will bring him the most glory. Also, there is nothing in it that is irrational or arbitrary, although it is sometimes beyond human understanding and explanation.
3. It is free, Isa. 40:13-14; Rom. 11:36
His determinations are influenced by no other since no one was present let alone existent when he decreed. This may be illustrated by considering creation. To create or not to create was optional with God. “He freely chose to create for reasons not known to us. While his love requires him to act lovingly toward any creatures he might bring into existence, it did not require that he create in order to have objects to love.” [10] If it could be said that God needs it could also be said that they are all met within the inter-trinitarian relationships (John 17:24).
4. It is unconditional, Isa. 46:10; Eph. 1:11; Acts 2:23; Eph. 2:8
There are no contingencies in the nature of the decree. Nothing is uncertain. Nothing in the decree is conditioned by anything not in the decree, although the elements of the decree are interdependent (that is, whatever conditions there are, are part of the decree and in relationship to sequence, only). The decree is not contingent upon the cooperation of others which cooperation it is in their power to withhold.
5. It is all inclusive, Eph. 1:11; Acts 17:6
As seen above it includes good acts, Eph. 2:10; evil acts, Prov. 16:4; Acts 2:23; apparently fortuitous acts, Prov. 16:33; Matt. 10:29-30; means and ends, Ps. 119:89-91; Eph. 1:4; 2 Thess. 2:13-14. Thus, it is related to man’s works in that it includes all that man does.
Recognition of this characteristic is important because an understanding of its significance will enable us to avoid a serious error. In a misguided and unfounded concern to protect God from the charge of arbitrariness and, more ostensibly, to assure man of his freedom some have insisted that only certain kinds of things and issues are in the decree while others bearing on human decision-making and destiny are in a category apart. However, as was noted in the discussion on the “eternal” character of the decree, no event is isolated from another. “If one event is decreed absolutely, all events must therefore be determined with it. If one event is left indeterminate, all future events will be left in greater or less degrees indeterminate with it.” [11] Man is free, not because his actions are excluded from the decree but precisely for the very opposite reason. His freedom arises from the relationship his actions sustain to every other event within the decree, that is, his freedom is of such a nature as is ordained of God.
6. It is immutable, Ps. 33:11; Isa. 46:9-1
There is no mistake of ignorance or inability in God’s plan. Further, he himself is changeless, faithful, and true and therefore will not change the plan.
References to God “repenting,” that is changing his mind (see e.g., Gen. 6:6; Exod. 32:14; 1 Sam. 15:11; Jer. 18:7-8, 26:3, 13, 19; Jonah 3:10), must be understood as anthropopathism in light of the clear statements of passages such as Numbers 23:19 and 1 Samuel 15:29. This is not an indication of change of plans but is a way of expressing divine disapproval of a given situation and/or the indication that God will begin a different course of action at this point.
7. It is efficacious, Ps 33:11; Isa. 14:24, 27; 46:9-11
What he has decreed will surely come to pass. Nothing can thwart his purpose. This does not mean he will directly accomplish all things.
a) Some things he has decreed to do himself immediately. This we would call first, direct or immediate cause.
b) Some things he has decreed to do through the agency of natural laws; what A. A. Hodge calls, “the action of second causes acting under a law of necessity.” [12] This is referred to as second or indirect cause, or mediate agency.
c) Some things he has decreed to do through the exercise of the will of moral creatures, “to prompt or to permit free agents to do in the exercise of their free agency.” [13] This is moral agency.
God’s decree determines only the certain futurition of events; it directly effects or causes no event. But the decree itself provides in every case that the event shall be effected by causes acting in a manner perfectly consistent with the nature of the event in question. Thus in the case of every free act of a moral agent the decree itself provides at the same time—(a) That the agent shall be a free agent. (b) That his antecedents and all the antecedents of the act in question shall be what they are. (c) That all the present conditions of the act shall be what they are. (d) That the act shall be perfectly spontaneous and free on the part of the agent. (e) That it shall be certainly future. [14]
A. A. Hodge further demonstrates the “certainty” of the decree as he notes, “The foreknowledge of God regards future events as certain. The ground of this certainty must be either in God, or in the events themselves, which last is fatalism.” [15] It must be remembered that this foreknowing predates time and all creation, including the wills of men. Thus the only ground for such knowing is the divine mind and the only ground for certainty regarding this knowledge could be his own decreed plan. “If God does not first decide what shall come to pass, he cannot know what will come to pass. An event must be made certain, before it can be known as a certain event.” [16]
8. It is permissive regarding sin, Ps. 78:29; 106:15; Act. 14:16; 17
God is not the author of sin (James 1:13) nor did he necessitate it in human experience. Nonetheless, he did decree to permit sin and to overrule it for good.
That God did not necessitate sin is seen from every passage of scripture calling mankind to moral accountability and from those passages which threaten his judgment on sin (see e.g., John 3:16-18, 36; Gen. 2:17; 2 Thess. 1:6-10; Rev. 20:11-15). That sin was instead permitted is set forth in such passages as Acts 14:16, “… he permitted all the nations to go their own ways” (cf. Acts 17:30; Ps. 78:29; 106:15). And, that he overrules sin for good is declared in Psalm 76:10 where Asaph tells us that man’s wrath will result in god’s praise.
This is beautifully illustrated in the past as Joseph gives tribute to God upon his reconciliation with his brothers: “You intended to harm me, but God intended it for good to accomplish what is now being done, the saving of many lives” (Gen. 50:20); and will be yet illustrated again in the future when every knee will bow and every tongue will confess that Jesus Christ is Lord with a view to the glory of God (Phil. 2:10-11).
The decree renders the future sinful act certain but does not hinder the sinful self-determination of the finite will. It regulates and controls the result of this sinful self-determination. Thus to speak of a permissive will or decree does not imply that the outcome of some acts is uncertain to God but rather that he permits them to come to pass by the free agency of his rational creatures rather than determining to bring them to pass by his own power. Permissive does not mean passive (which would imply something was beyond his control), nor does certainty mean compulsion (which would negate free agency altogether and place responsibility with God rather than man). [17]
9. It is related to the Works of God
It is related to the works of God in that it does not affect the relationship within the Godhead, that is, it has to do with his transitive acts (opera ad extra). It does not include the purely immanent (opera ad intra) acts within the divine being which result in the trinitarian distinctions, nor does it pertain to the intrinsic or essential being of God. For example, he does not decree to be holy, to exist as a tri-unity, to generate the Son, etc.
10. It is related to the knowledge of God, 1 Chron. 28:9
God's knowledge maybe viewed as relating to his decree in a logical order both antecedently and subsequently. The proper order is omniscience, eternal purpose (decree), and foreknowledge.
As understood in this interrelationship omniscience is necessary or essential knowledge. It is that comprehensive knowledge that relates to possibilities as well as actualities and is true of God because he is God. Omniscience, then, comprehends all possible plans and effects unto infinity as well as actual plans which we call the decree.
From among the possible plans one was chosen by an act of perfect will, led by wise consideration, according to divine good-pleasure, and to accomplish his own glory. This is the plan that he wanted to bring to realization and represented those thoughts out of his omniscience which he determined to objectify.
Of this plan God has foreknowledge or what may be called free (as over against necessary) knowledge of things as they are determined to be realized in the course of history.
11. The decree to act is not the act itself
At this point the question of logical priority regarding God’s eternal purpose, vis-à-vis, man’s actions arises. What is the proper cause-effect relationship between these two? Are human actions first fixed in God’s plan and then realized in history or does God first discover human actions by prescience (foresight) and then fix his plan? Does a positive response to God’s invitation make the decree possible or does the decree make the response possible?
It is not our purpose to provide an extended answer to these questions at this point, but, as will be demonstrated later, a biblical understanding of man’s total depravity, the doctrine of human freedom, and divine foreknowledge will only allow us an unconditional view of God’s eternal purpose. To place God in the position of responder to man is to destroy divine sovereignty.
Now, having established this order we must next distinguish the plan from the execution of the plan. “The decrees are an internal manifestation and exercise of the divine attributes, rendering the futurition of things certain but this exercise of the intelligent volition of God should not be confounded with the realization of its objects in creation, providence, and redemption.” [18] For example, the decree to create is not creation itself. We must distinguish between (a) God so ordering the universe so that man will pursue a certain course of action, and (b) God’s so commanding him to do so. God’s decrees are not of the nature of statute law (that is they are not legislative). They do not impose compulsion or obligation upon the wills of men and are not addressed to men. [19] “The plan of God does not force men to act in particular ways, but renders it certain that they will freely act in those ways.” [20] As part of the answer he offers to the question, “What are the proper practical effects of this doctrine?” Hodge states that we must always remember “… that God’s precepts as distinctly revealed, and not his decrees, are the rule of our duty.” [21]
C. The Purpose of the Decree
What end does God have in view with his decree? What is the ultimate goal of all things? Without hesitation we must answer, the glory of God!
Whether it be in creation, providence, or redemption (Ps. 19:1; Num. 14:21; Isa. 6:3; Rev. 4:11, Eph. 1:6, 12, 14) the focus of his plan is his own glory. Nor is this to be faulted as though it were somehow tainted with self-aggrandizement.
In man it would be selfishness to seek for his own glory, but that is because man is sinful and imperfect. To seek for his own glory would be to seek to glorify sinfulness and imperfection. But this is not the case with God. He is absolutely sinless and perfect in holiness. For him to aim at his own glory is, therefore, merely to seek the glory of absolute holiness and sinless perfection. [22]
This is not to say, of course, that God does not have his creatures’ welfare in view in the decree. Paul exhorts us to fix our hope in “God who richly supplies us with all things to enjoy” (1 Tim. 6:7) and reminds us that he provides the bounties of nature with a view to satisfying our hearts with food and gladness (Acts 16:17). Our Lord prayed for his will for us (1 Thess. 4:3, 8). All of these things, however, are what Erickson calls “secondary motivations.” “We must exist for his sake, for his glory and pleasure, rather than he for ours.” [23]
V. Major Manifestations of the Decree
The major manifestations of the decree are creation, providence, and the redemptive kingdom program. The first two of these items will be dealt with in the two subsequent chapters. The third item will be treated briefly in the following discussion and developed more in the sections on soteriology, ecclesiology and eschatology.
VI. Salvation in the Decree
A. Order in the Decree (ordo salutis)
1. Introduction
Since this discussion relates to eternal decrees the order given is logical rather than chronological.
2. Hyper-Calvinism (Supralapsarianism)
So named because the decree to elect is above the decree to permit the Fall.
a) Decree to elect a definite number of possible men and to reprobate a definite number of possible men (to manifest his mercy and justice respectively).
b) Decree to create the men thus elected and reprobated.
c) Decree to permit them to fall.
d) Decree to save the elect and condemn the reprobate.3. Calvinism
a) Limited atonement (Sub-lapsarianism)
Note: the prefixes “sub” and “infra” are often used interchangeably to denote a view that places the decree to elect below the decree to permit the Fall; in this presentation they are distinguished as to how far below).
(1) Decree to create all men.
(2) Decree to permit the Fall.
(3) Decree to elect some out of the fallen multitude and leave others in their misery.
(4) Decree to provide salvation for the elect.
(5) Decree to save the elect through Christ.b) Unlimited atonement—limited redemption (infralapsarianism)
(1) Decree to create all men.
(2) Decree to permit the Fall.
(3) Decree to provide salvation sufficient for all men with a view to their redemption or condemnation.
(4) Decree to elect some from among fallen mankind and to leave the others in their sin.
(5) Decree to save the elect through faith in Christ.4. Arminianism
It actually does not have a formal scheme, but it would be as follows.
a) Decree to create all men.
b) Decree to permit the Fall.
c) Decree to provide salvation sufficient for all.
d) Decree to count as elect those who through foreseen faith will believe in Christ.The decree is premised on foresight (foreknowledge so defined). Thus election (predestination) is the issue of foreknowledge (defined as mere prescience). Salvation is the ground of election rather than vice versa. [24]
5. Summary
The first and fourth of these views have the least to commend them from the standpoint of a harmony of the biblical data. They represent extremes of logic, on the one hand, and anthropocentrism, on the other.
Hodge points out the problems with the Supralapsarianism view.
This scheme is unquestionably the most logical of all. It is postulated upon the principle, that what is last in execution is first in intention, which undoubtedly holds true in all spheres comprehended in human experience. Hence it is argued that if the final result of the whole matter is the glorification of God in the salvation of the elect and the perdition of the non-elect, it must have been the deliberate purpose of God from the beginning. But the case is too high and too vast for a priori application and enforcement of the ordinary rules of human judgment; we can here only know in virtue of and within the limits of a positive revelation.
The objections against this scheme are—
1st. Man creatable is a non-entity. He could not have been loved or chosen unless created.
2nd. The whole language of Scripture upon this subject implies that the “elect” are chosen as objects of eternal love, not from the number of creatable, but from the mass of actually sinful men.—John xv. 19; Rom. xi. 5, 7.
3rd. The scriptures declare that the elect are chosen to sanctification, and to the sprinkling of the blood of Christ. They must therefore, have been regarded when chosen as guilty and defiled by sin.—1 Pet. i.21; Eph. i. 4-6.
4th. Predestination includes reprobation. This view represents God as reprobating the non-elect by a sovereign act, without any respect to their sins, simply for his own glory. This appears to be inconsistent with the divine righteousness, as well as the teaching of Scripture. [25]The Arminian view goes to the other extreme, leaving the question of election completely open until it is determined by man himself. It assumes that if God is to be just he must not only provide salvation sufficient for all but make provision through prevenient grace for t he possibility for all to believe. This introduces a completely extra-biblical concept into the scheme which transmutes total depravity into partial depravity by excluding the will from the ravages of the fall. It also must rely on a concept of foreknowledge which is contrary to biblical usage.
The two views I have designated as sub- and infra-lapsarianism remain as viable alternatives. Whereas supra-lapsarianism is associated with Beza, the sub-lapsarian view is usually associated with Calvin and has certainly been the majority view. It holds to the concept of a limited atonement, that is that Christ died with the elect alone in view, and states that “… Christ did not come to make salvation possible, but to effect it for all when he died.” [26]
It is at this point that I must take issue with this view and therefore opt for the infra-lapsarian position. This has sometimes been identified with the Amyraldian view which holds to the same ordo salutis but has at least two significant differences as set forth in this study. It differs from the Amyraldian and Arminian view in holding that the death of Christ did not merely make salvation possible but actually made it certain for the elect. It further holds that God elects only some, which distinguishes it from Arminianism, and that the death of Christ becomes the basis for the salvation of the elect and for the condemnation of the non-elect (in addition to the universal condemnation which is true because of inherited and imputed sin), which distinguishes it from Amyraldianism.
Infra-lapsarian and sub-lapsarian views are to be distinguished in that the former holds that the elect will be saved as a result of the electing grace of God and the finished work of Christ as appropriated by the individual through the gift of faith. The latter holds that election “effects” salvation for the elect and thus tending to minimize the biblical emphasis upon personal faith. These last two views will be discussed more extensively in Chapter 33.
B. Predestination, Acts 4:27-28; Rom. 8:29-30; 1 Cor. 2:7; Eph. 1:5, 11
1. Relationship to foreknowledge
a) Theologically
The theologians usually view this as being the logical outgrowth of predestination (see IV, B, 10 above). To the extent that this helps to clarify the difference between God’s necessary and free knowledge, and their respective relationships to the decree, this is helpful. It must be noted, however, that this is not the way the term is used in the biblical text (see below) and it does not account for the statements of Romans 8:29 where the verbs “predestinated” and “foreknew” are probably best understood as co-ordinate, with “foreknew” (in the sense of “fore love”) as the logical antecedent.
b) Biblically
In biblical usage the two concepts are sequential only in the foreknowledge points to initiating cause, namely, God’s love in his choice, while predestination points to the willing act which determines the destiny or outcome.
First Peter 1:1-2 and related passages provide the biblical basis for an understanding of this matter.
The words kata prognōsin and following introduce the problem. The question is what do these phrases modify? Actually, the apparent problem of separation from the nearest natural antecedent, eklektois, is not a great one, since all the words that follow between it and kata are actually one unit. Selwyn and Hort have suggested that it should be understood as modifying both elektios and apostolos, since they are both verbal substantives. However, apostolos is removed even further from the prepositional phrases and it puts Peter into the position of defending his apostleship which was never questioned (as was Paul’s). It is better to take the phrases with eklektois only, as a further epexegesis or explanation of election.
Such an elaboration, showing the work of the Trinity (cf. 2 Thessalonians 2:13 where the Trinity also is mentioned), would prove to be a great encouragement to the believers in this time of suffering. Regarding this electing work, the norm is established by the Father, the sphere wrought by the Spirit, and the purpose is in relation to the Son.
Kata prognōsin also introduces the theological problem. Is “elect … according to foreknowledge” to be construed as meaning that God chooses us after having previously discovered that we will exercise faith through the exercise of his power of pre-vision? That is, is predestination conditioned on foresight or foreknowledge as popularly conceived?
The answer is to be found in the meaning of prognōsis. It has two basic usages in the New Testament. In Acts 26:5 and 2 Peter 3:17, when used of men, the verbal form means “to know beforehand.” The substantival form is only used in one other passage, Acts 2:23, where it clearly involves prior choice. The one article tei (“the”) links both counsel and foreknowledge together and both are modified by hōrismenei, “determined” or “fixed.”
Peter’s use of the verb form in 1 Peter 1:20 readily shows that he has more than mere prescience in view. The two participles of verse 20, proegnōsmenou (“lovingly chosen beforehand”), and phanerothentos (“make manifest”), refer back to “Christ” in verse 19 and indicate the pre-temporal and temporal aspects of the redemption (v. 18) he is discussing. In eternity past Christ was chosen to be the redeemer; “in these last times,” Peter says, he appeared as such “for your sake.” God not only knew ahead of time that Christ would be the Lamb (a concept that is self-evident and tautological), he determined it. No other interpretation of proegnōsmenou makes sense here, especially when the intended contrast between the two participles is observed. To say that the foresight of Christ is made manifest is nonsense. Rather, it was God’s eternal purpose that came into view. This meaning is captured in the Authorized Version’s “foreordained” and in “chosen” of the New International Version.
Further, an examination of passages such as Romans 8:29 and 11:2 makes it clear that God is not described as knowing what men will do but of knowing men. This emphasis upon the whom rather than the what points to the fact that the thing which differentiates these men from others lies in the act of knowing rather than outside in the man.
This use of “know” is also seen in the simplex form of ginōsko in the New Testament, as well as yadah in the Old Testament (see Gen. 18:19; Exod. 2:25; Ps. 1:6; 144:3; Jer 1:5; Hos. 13:5; Amos 3:2; Matt. 7:23; John 10:27; 1 Cor. 8:3; Gal. 4:9; 2 Tim. 2:19; 1 John 3:1).
The meaning is thus seen to be “to take special note of” or it is almost “synonymous with ‘love,’ to set regard upon, to know with peculiar interest, delight, affection and action.” [27] When the prefix pro is added, it thus comes to mean “preceding (previous) special affection” or “forelove,” “sovereign distinguishing love”. [28]
The standard by which God operates, that which moves him in his choice of men, is love. (Cf. Paul’s statement in Eph. 1:5, en agape proorisas.) The difference between election and foreknowledge, then, is that election places the emphasis upon will, while foreknowledge has affection in mind. [29]
2. Parts of Predestination
To some predestination is seen as a terrifying and perverse doctrine whereby some are arbitrarily chosen and others jus as arbitrarily damned. Various efforts have been made to empty this doctrine of its terror, often by emphasizing the love of God at the expense of his justice and holiness. One such attempt, which has led to a form of neo-universalism, was that of Karl Barth. While he himself claimed not to hold to universalistic doctrine his treatment of this issue has universalist tendencies, at the least.
His attempt to resolve the problem with predestination as he saw it was to sum up election in Christ. He alone is God’s elect. Then, as Henry points out,
To the doctrine of election Barth adds the interchangeability of the election of Christ with the election of all men, that is, he refuses to limit the connection of Christ’s election to but some elected persons as a selective elect, rather than including all mankind. In Christ, says Barth, all humans are elected to salvation; Christ is reprobated as their substitute. [30]
In Barth's own words, “Seen from the viewpoint of His election there are outside of Him no rejected ones.” [31]
The proper resolution of any apparent dissonance in this doctrine, however, is to accept the entire revelation about God and his works. If we emphasize the personal element, that is God in all of his personal perfections, and view this as the doctrine of God predestinating rather than simply as the doctrine of predestination, we will be on safer ground.
a) Election
How important is the doctrine of election? Is it peripheral or central to the outworking of God’s purposes? Does it obscure or illuminate the grace of God? Rightly understood election must be acknowledged as a key truth of the Christian faith.
If we eliminate election from the Bible we may as readily eliminate creation, or the special status of ancient Israel, or the incarnation of the Word, or the existence of the Church as Christ’s body; we may equally dispense with the Sinai commandments and the Sermon on the Mount as ethical norms. No indispensable need would then remain, moreover, for Jesus Christ as Savior of the world, as fulfiller of the prophetic promises, as Lord of All and Coming King; nor need we accommodate any absolute distinction between heaven and hell to define man’s possible destinies…. The singular uniqueness of Judeo-Christian revelation rests upon the governing premise of divine election; the truth of revealed religion stands or falls on the factuality of that election. [32]
Basically, all deserve condemnation, but in his grace, apart from works, God chose us and then proceeded to win us. Election is that phase of God’s eternal purpose or decree whereby he certainly and eternally determines by means of unconditional loving choice who will believe. It is not mere purpose to give salvation to those who may believe, but rather it determines who will believe (1 Pet. 1:1-2; 2 Tim. 1:9; Eph. 1:4-5; 2 Thess. 2:13-14; Rom. 8:29-30; 9:14-24).
Two representative passages will be noted which clearly teach this truth. Second Thessalonians 2:13-14 immediately follows a section wherein the apostle has been referring to eschatological events dealing with the appearance of the man of sin, Satan’s work in the end times, and God’s consummation of these particular incidents. The Apostle Paul makes reference to some who will be duped by the man of sin and by Satan. He describes these as being involved in the deceit of unrighteousness, as those that are perishing because they receive not the love of the truth that they might be saved. Now, in contrast, in verse 13 he says, “But we are bound to give thanks to God always for you brethren, beloved of the Lord, because God has chosen you unto salvation,” rather than having condemned you as he condemned those referred to above.
In the verses which follow, particularly verse 15, he draws some logical and practical conclusions regarding the truths stated in verses 13 and 14. He shows that these highly theological concepts are exceedingly practical. “So then, brethren, stand fast and hold fast the traditions which you were taught whether by word or whether by the epistle that is ours.” Paul is enjoining upon them the fact that the work of God, rather than excluding human efforts and responsibility, furnishes a reason for human effort and responsibility.
In verse 13 he addresses them with significant terminology. He calls them “brethren” and he says that they are “beloved of the Lord.” He describes them in a way that would tell us that he is writing to people who became objects of God’s love at a particular point in the past and that they at this point, as he writes, continue to be objects of that love in relationship to that originating point. Furthermore, the way he says this leads us to realize that the recipients of this love are recipients in an absolute sense. He says that they are beloved by the Lord. That is, love was exercised on their behalf.
First of all, he speaks of the divine choice. He says that this choice was divinely originated, divinely realized, and divinely accomplished or finalized. The first statement in verse 13 is, “God chose you from the beginning,” and here his is pointing to the terminus a quo, the very initial source of this whole thing. The beginning, the divine origination, was in eternity.
Secondly, he tells us that this was divinely realized. The phrase “sanctification of the Spirit” describes the work of the Spirit of God in God’s choosing process. This refers to the work of efficacious grace. He is talking about the sphere of the operation in which this choice moves. It is in the sphere of sanctification which is accomplished by the Spirit. This, as well as the following phrase, is a subjunctive genitive. This phase of the work of the spirit in sanctification indicates how he prepares the individual to be saved before salvation. Related to this is “the belief of the truth,” the work of the Word. The work of the Spirit is wed with the work of the Word. These two concepts are grammatically combined because both the term “sanctification” and the term “belief” are governed by one preposition, the word “in.” Efficacious grace and the efficacious call are all tied together. The Spirit does the work of pre-salvation sanctification. The Word quickens the heart of the believer as it is preached.
Thirdly, there is the divine finalization of the process. It is unto salvation. Here we have the terminus ad quem, and it is again eternal. We move from eternity through time and into eternity again because salvation is not just a temporal concept. It is related to the choice of God which is an eternal thing. Salvation is to be taken in the broadest sense of the word, the initiating sense, the continuing sense, and the climactic sense all combined.
Now, built upon this truth and growing out of this truth, the call of God is introduced. There is a significant relationship between verse 14, where we see this being worked out historically, and verse 13, where we have the eternal declaration of the fact. It is this “unto which,” meaning unto the realization of the choice, God called. Here is the transition from eternity to time.
The call involves the human equation, our gospel. Here is the point where we become involved. This term “our gospel” is not just a reference to the good news that Christ died. It is that, but it is more than that because it has the pronoun “our” attached to it. It is personalized. Paul defines this for us in 1 Thessalonians 1:5 as having certain elements.
The gospel which can be called “our gospel” involves the Word of God in declaration or discourse, a rational statement of the fact. He says, “when we came, our Gospel came not in word only,” but it did come in word.
Secondly, he says it came in power. That is, it involves dynamic, probably the dynamic of the gospel as referred to in Romans 1:16. The third thing named is the Holy Spirit and much confidence, or full assurance. This is one truth with two facets. The divine cause related with the human effect. Thus our gospel involves declaration; it involves dynamic in the life; and it involves the work of the Spirit of God which issues in confidence in the hearer and in the speaker.
Finally, there is the consummation. Here, again, we have two thoughts. He says, “Whereunto he called you through our gospel to the obtaining our responsibility] of the glory of our Lord Jesus Christ,” [his provision]. Our responsibility is intimated in the word that is translated “obtaining.” The word is “peripoēsis” which may have one or the other of two possible interpretations depending on its usage.
The word when used in an absolute sense, without any modifying term, or phrase, is used passively and translated “possession” (see e.g. Eph. 1:14, “unto the redemption of God’s own possession”). But when it is accompanied by a genitive, as it is here, it has an active sense and may be given the meaning of “obtaining” which then involves us. We are involved in the obtaining of the glory, not exclusively, not by ourselves, but under the impetus and enablement of the Spirit of God.
Finally, in summary, it must be remembered that the passage has two basic thrusts—God chose (elected) and God called. All the way through human responsibility is interwove, but the electing work is God’s.
Romans 9 is the other passage to be considered. Paul begins the chapter with an expression of personal grief over the fact that his fellow Israelites were rejecting Christ (vv. 1-5). He then proceeds to show that this is neither out of line with God’s written word (vv. 6-13) nor with his justice (vv. 14-18). In verses 6-13, he demonstrates that the relationship with God is not a matter of physical descent (“they are not all Israel who are descended from Israel”—vv. 6-9); that it is not a matter of personal character or works (“were not yet born, and had not done anything good or bad”—vv. 10-11a); but, that it is a matter of God’s sovereign choice on a strictly personal basis (“that God’s purpose according to his choice might stand … of him who calls”—vv. 11b-13). (It should be noted here that those who try to water down the doctrine of election by making this an impersonal mass election of the nation rather than seeing it as individual and personal need to re-read the passage more carefully. Paul is speaking of individuals within the nation rather than the nation itself.)
This inevitably leads to two questions regarding God’s justice (vv. 14, 19). The first question relates to the character of god himself, while the second has to do with his dealings with man. Verses 14-24 may be outlined as follows to see the development of Paul’s argument:
1) Cycle number one (vv.14-18)
i. Question: “Is there injustice with God?” (14a).
Is God unjust in making sovereign choices such as he did between Isaac and Ishmael or between Jacob and Esau even before they were born and had done anything good or bad?
ii. Answer: “May it never be!” (14b).
The very suggestion is unthinkable and intolerable.
i) Development of the answer from scripture (Exod. 33:19) as it relates to the exercise of mercy in the choice of Jacob (and any other of whom he would be representative).
Verse 15 notes that in answer to Moses’ request for grace (note the repeated reference to “favor,” i.e. grace, in Exod. 32:12 ff.) God says that the recipients of His mercy and compassion are his determination (“I will … I will”). This leads to the conclusion (16) that mercy is not of human choice, nor of human action, but of divine fiat alone.
ii) Development of the answer from scripture (Exod. 9:16) as it relates to the exercise of hardening in the rejection of Esau (and any other of whom he would be representative).
Verse 17 cites another example from history and shows that even the events of heathen nations and their monarchs are ordained of God; Pharaoh in his sin was accomplishing the purpose of god, namely the manifestation of his power and the declaration of his person (name). “The hardening … is of a judicial character. It presupposes ill-desert and, in the case of Pharaoh, particularly the ill-desert of his self-hardening.” [33] Not only does God show mercy to those of his choice, he also hardens (prevents from responding to mercy) whom he will. Cf. Rom. 1:24, 26, 28.
Before going to the next point, certain observations are in order: 1) In light of the answer given to the question of verse 14, it may be seen that it is not a matter of justice but of sovereign and free grace that is involved in God’s election; 2) The whole discussion, both regarding the showing of mercy and the hardening, is in light of the fact that everyone deserves condemnation; 3) Therefore, whoever receives mercy owes this favor to an act of God’s sovereign will; 4) The question of verse 14 “could not arise unless Paul wished himself to be understood as teaching that God chose Jacob and rejected Esau for no assignable reason outside his own will. If God chose Jacob because he foresaw his faith or his virtue, and rejected Esau for an opposite character, reason would approve and the question of this verse would not be asked.” [34]
2) Cycle number two (vv. 19-24)
i. Question: “Why does he still find fault? Now who resists his will?” (19).
If God determines the objects of his mercy and displeasure, and if man has no part in that choice, how can man be held accountable? This question, then, is tantamount to saying, if all things are as he willed, when he finds fault; it is with his own will, for no one resists his will.
i) Answer: none is given
Rather than answering the question, he deals with the attitude that would raise such a question.
ii) Statement (20a) (in question form)
The force of this statement as expressed in the Greek text may be illustrated as follows: “O man, on the contrary, who are you to reply against God?” How presumptuous to think that the creature could question the Creator’s governing processes. If you really understood the true God and his ways, you would know that such an objection is preposterous.
ii. Illustration (20b-21)
The potter, not the lump of clay, determines the character of the vessel formed; it is his prerogative to do so (“right,” NASB, “power,” AV, is the translation of exousia which is not merely power but authority). By the same token, God alone determines how best his purposes are served--by a Moses toward whom he is merciful or by a Pharaoh whom he hardens. Since the illustration has to do with the fashioning of the clay not its creation, it applies to men as sinners rather than to men as men. Both Moses and Pharaoh were fashioned from the same sinful lump, but one was made a vessel unto honor and the other a vessel unto dishonor.
iii. Application (22-24).
These verses contain an unfinished sentence. A condition is introduced with a protasis for which there is no apodosis. There is a “what if …” but there is no “then.” If God has some vessels of wrath and some vessels of mercy, what have we to say about it? Certainly, there is no injustice here on God’s part. Verse 22 notes that he is longsuffering when none is deserved, while verse 23 points out that he extends to some the riches of his glory which is likewise not deserved. Notice, too, the careful distinction made between the two types of vessels in the form of the statements. The word “prepared” in verse 22 is a passive form with no expressed agent. This is purposeful ambiguity which points to human responsibility within the eternal purposes of God. On the other hand, “before prepared is active with God as the subject. Man may fit himself for destruction but God alone
prepares for glory.” [35]b) Reprobation
In the very act of choosing some, God determines the destiny of others by simply passing them by. This is not rightly called predestination to judgment or double predestination because scripture never uses the term predestination in regard to the lost. It does, however, use certain other terminology, for example, “whose name has not been written in the book of life of the Lamb who was slain from the foundation of the world”; “those who were long before marked out for this condemnation”; “who stumble because hey are disobedient to the word, unto which also they were appointed” (Rev. 13:8; Jude 4; Rom. 9:18, 21, 22; 1 Pet. 2:8; see also 2 Thess. 1:6-9).
1) The negative aspect
This consists of passing over these and refusing to elect them to life. Thus, this is a sovereign act, since those passed over were no worse than those elected and the reason for both choosing and passing over is god’s sovereign good-pleasure. That is, it cannot be related to sin alone since all are sinners nor can it be related to an arbitrary act of will since it is among the “all things” comprehended in his will which in turn is according to his good-pleasure (Eph. 1:9, 11). This is designated as preterition.
2) The positive aspect
This involves condemnation to eternal misery. Thus, it is judicial because God inflicts misery in any case only as the righteous punishment for sins. This is designated as condemnation.
VII. Problems Related to the Decree
A. The Problem of Sin: How can a Holy God Include Sin in the Decree?
Before we can consider the question of sin in the decree a prior and related question must be addressed. Is the presence of evil in the universe compatible with the idea of a benevolent and omnipotent God? Does the presence of evil rule out the existence of God, at least as set forth in Christian theology? This apparent dilemma has had a variety of solutions proposed. They range all the way from atheism, which attempts to solve the problem by eliminating God from the picture; to dualism which proposes two equally viable principles or ontological realities in the universe; to various philosophical and liberal theological schools of thought which set forth a finite god; to process theology which so identifies God with the creation that he is hopelessly involved with both good and evil to the extent that no absolute distinction between them is possible.
What are the factors with which we must work in proposing a solution? First of all, revelation affirms that god not only exists but that he is infinite in power, goodness and holiness. From the standpoint of biblical theology any diminishing of these perfections of God is heresy and will lead to an even greater dilemma and more profound evil than that with which we are now grappling.
In solving the problem of evil, Christianity rejects such explanations a divine deficiency, cosmic inevitability, evolutionary necessity, intrinsic historical disorder, human illusion or psychiatric aberration. Accepting but also confronting the horrendous reality of sin and pain and moral and physical evil it ventures a solution by first of all acknowledging God as omnipotent and also wise and beneficent. [36]
Secondly, revelation affirms and experience attests that there is in the universe both natural and moral evil (sin) of great proportions. Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that the suffering that inevitably accompanies evil sometimes seems disproportionate or altogether undeserved. Some evil leads to greater good than would have been true without it. Suffering, for example, may be corrective or instructive, but what of suffering that is neither?
Carl Henry quotes Edward H. Madden and Peter H. Hare as follows: “… evil obviously serves good ends. But much evil resists simple explanation; It is prima facie gratuitous." [37] They continue by pointing out the "unbearable pain and suffering caused by either natural events or the acts of other men, character defects, immoral acts, physical and mental deformity, the prosperity of rogues, and the failure of honest men." [38] which, Henry says, is a recognition of the “experiential adversity and calamity of the sort that Bible readers will recall if not from personal relationships with Hitler, Stalin and Mao, then from their reading of Job and other scriptural sources." [39]
Thirdly, the Bible teaches that evil exists not apart from but as a part of the eternal purpose of God. This is clearly affirmed in Isaiah 45:5-7 where, after an assertion and reassertion of his own absolute sovereignty, Yahweh states, “I form the light and create darkness; I make peace and create evil.” Many have tried to limit ra (evil) to natural evil or human disaster (not e.g., “causing well-being and creating calamity” (NASB); “I bring prosperity and bring disaster” (NIV) but even if this be an accurate understanding the dilemma remains. The problem is that ra does mean “evil,” in the sense of “wickedness” elsewhere (see e.g., Gen. 6:5). The fact of the situation is that God is the one who is ultimately behind the presence of evil in the universe. The question, then, is not whether in this sense he created it but whether in doing so he commits evil. Henry gives us help here.
God can be the ultimate cause of evil, as orthodox theism conceives him, without himself being an aspect of evil, or of evil being an aspect of him as its cause. God created giraffes, but he is not a giraffe, nor are giraffes aspects of God.
Since the distinction between good and evil is grounded in God’s will, the sovereign God in some sense creates sin. But to say that God commits sin is unthinkable, for Scripture throughout depicts sin as abhorrent to him. [40]
This truth is testified to by James when he states, “Let no one say when he is being tempted, ‘I am being tempted by God’; for God cannot be tempted by evil, and he himself tempts no one” (1:13).
Fourthly, the responsibility for the appearance of sin in the universe is laid at Satan’s feet (John 8:44; 1 John 3:8; cf. Ezek. 28:15); its appearance in human history is traced to the willful disobedience of Adam and Eve as they followed Satan’s lead rather than God’s command (Gen. 2:16-17; 3:1-7: Rom. 5:12).
Fifthly, while on occasion god’s purposes in allowing suffering are realized in history (e.g., Heb. 12:9-11; 1 Pet. 5:8-10), they often remain an undisclosed mystery. Job finally came to acknowledge that what God was allowing was right even though he is never given an explanation why (Job 42:1-6). The final and complete explanation and judgment of evil is yet to come and is assured. He who was wise, benevolent, omnipotent and holy in decreeing will likewise be the same in the consummation of all things (see e.g., Heb. 10:30-31; Rev. 22:12-15).
Finally, God has conclusively demonstrated his sovereignty over sin and evil and anticipated and guaranteed its eschatological judgment in the finished work of Christ. In his death and resurrection he was victor not victim (John 16:11; Col. 2:15; Heb. 2:14-15; 1 John 3:8) and thereby released the power that “put all things in subjection under his feet” and which will make his enemies his footstool for his feet (Eph. 1:19-22; Acts 2:32-35, cf. Ps. 110:1).
With this background we can now offer an answer to our initial question. It must be carefully noted that while he did include sin in the decree he never takes the responsibility for it for "not everything that is has been efficiently caused by God." [41] The decree of God is to be distinguished from the causative will of God. The decree, as the plan of God for his universe, includes all things but causes nothing. God himself causes certain things in keeping with his perfect nature as noted in Scripture (e.g., the creation of the material universe; the spiritual new creation of new life in Jesus Christ). Other things are causatively attributed to various moral means (e.g., Satan; man's sinful will). This is markedly different from the will of Allah as set forth in Islam.
Everything, good or evil, in this world exists by His will. He wills the faith of the believer and the piety of the religious. If He were to change His will there would be neither a true believer nor a pious man. He willeth also the unbelief of the unbeliever and the irreligion of the wicked and, without that will, there would neither be unbelief nor irreligion. All that we do we do by His will; what He willeth not does not come to pass. [42]
This summary statement is a reflection of the theological thinking of Ashari as he writes:
And say: There cannot be either good nor evil on the earth except what Allah wills, and all things are [because] of the will of Allah, as the Glorious and Noble One says [in al Quran 29:81], "no [one] wills (or desires) except what Allah wills." And as the Muslims say, "What Allah wills was (or is) and what he did not will is not."
And say: No one can do anything before [God] does it, can one be able to leave the knowledge of Allah or do anything that Allah knows that he will not do. We vouchsafe that there is no creator except Allah, and that the wrongdoings of the believers [were] created by Allah, and that the good deeds of the believers were created by Allah, Glorious and Noble One, and that the believers cannot create anything. And that Allah designated the believers to obedience, and forsook the unbelievers; and gives grace to the believers, and looks after them, correcting them, guiding them; and does not give grace to the unbelievers, does not correct them, and does not guide them; and if he corrected them they would be rightly guided.
That Allah, praise be to him, could correct unbelievers and give grace to them until they become believers, but he desired not to correct the unbelievers and give them grace until they became believers, but [instead] he desired that they would be unbelievers as he predestined, and [thus] forsook them, led them astray and imprinted [this] on their hearts.
And that good and evil were because of the predestination of Allah and his will; and we believe in Allah's predestination and will, the good of it and the bad of it; the sweetness of it and its bitterness; and that they do not have any advantage or disadvantage in and of themselves except by the will of Allah .... [43]
"Sin is no part of creation, but a quality introduced into creation by the creature itself." [44] It came through choice as the creature exercised his will in opposition to God's. Thus it originated at the initial rebellion against God's will by Satan of whom it is written, "unrighteousness was uncovered in thee," Ezek. 28:15. Furthermore, James 1:13 declares that God not only is not but cannot be the responsible author of sin.
Sin as a principle has always existed in the abstract (that is, as the theoretical opposite of righteousness) as long as God has existed. That is to say, good as a concept embodied in God from all eternity has meaning only in relationship to non-good (evil) even though until the creation and fall of angels and then mankind it was nothing more than a theoretical possibility. With the decree the abstract becomes concrete and judgable.
The purpose for sin in the universe may be considered in light of the following concepts (none of which individually, nor all combined, are a complete answer):
1. Those whom god is bringing into likeness with himself must come to know to some degree what he knows. The must recognize the evil character of sin either by resistance to it or by submitting to it and being redeemed therefrom.
2. In order to display his grace there must be creatures who are objects of it. Only in this way could man know experientially God’s saving power. If sin were not allowed to be manifest, that grace may be shown, there would be in his character an attribute which would otherwise be unknown (Eph. 1:6; 2:7).
3. The principle of sin must be brought into complete and final judgment and to submission to himself. To demonstrate his absolute
sovereignty he allowed the abstract principle to become concrete that he might judge it. “in purposing to permit sin, God purposes to overrule it for God” (Shedd, op. cit., I. 408), Ps. 76:10; Gen. 45:8; 50:20. [45]For these reasons, therefore, God permitted sin but did not promote it.
B. The Problem of Will: Is there Indeed Human Responsibility? Does man have freedom of choice since all things are decreed?
Freedom of choice is part of the decree, not separate from it. The Bible teaches throughout that man is responsible for his actions and that he has moral choice. “Liberty (freedom) does not consist in the power of acting or not acting, but in action from choice. The choice is determined by something in the mind itself, or by something external influencing the mind; but, whatever is the cause, the choice makes the action free, and the agent accountable.” [46] In examining this definition of freedom it is of utmost importance to note the difference between ability and freedom. These are often confused which confusion leads to much grief. Action from choice is the essence of freedom. The lack of ability to always act to the contrary (that is against one’s nature) does not vitiate freedom or ones accountability. For example, God cannot (lack ability) to do evil, yet in always choosing the good He is no less free as he follows his nature. Likewise, unbelieving man cannot do good, yet in always choosing the evil he is free as he follows his fallen nature and is, therefore, accountable for his actions.
We use free in the sense that the individual is not conscious of any necessity being imposed upon him; that is, he acts as his own mind and will direct him. It must be remembered that freedom of any kind or in any realm lies within the realm of law—in this case God’s law. It is conformity to his laws. It is made possible because of laws. Further, what freedom a man enjoys is consonant with his nature as human, that is, he is a creature and thus finite so his freedom is finite creature freedom. Also, he is a fallen being and thus his power of choice is exercised by a fallen will which is only disposed toward evil and incapable of choosing the good (in the spiritual or redemptive sense, that is). Thus while he is volitionally free (accountable) he is morally bound. [47]
VIII. Objection to the Decree
A. It Is Inconsistent With Moral Freedom
This objection involves a misunderstanding of what moral freedom is. We must remember that man is totally morally depraved (and thus incapable of being morally free). The objection also arises from a failure to distinguish certainty and compulsion. It assumes certainty is not consistent with free agency. “No one can demonstrate that it is beyond the power of God to make a voluntary act of man an absolutely certain event. If he could he would disprove the divine omnipotence.” [48] “Although fallen, man is yet a responsible moral agent. He still has reason, conscience, and the freedom of choice in the sense that he can recognize moral distinctions and choose or reject as he sees fit. He still may do and appreciate good things in relation to his fellow man. But, he lost in the fall the rational power to determine his course in the direction of the highest good. He is not able to understand, seek or do spiritual things which lead to salvation.” [49]
To raise such an objection as this against the decree further betrays a lack of understanding of the origins of human freedom. It seems to assume that human freedom has an independent existence all its own, failing to recognize that it exists by the good pleasure of God.
The notion that God’s foreordination destroys human choice is countered by the emphasis that God’s foreordination actually makes possible whatever agency man has ever had and now retains. Were it not for God’s eternal decree, man would not even exist as a morally responsible creature.
Nearly all scholars who oppose predestination by emphasizing responsibility offer no theory of human responsibility. The fact is that man does not have, nor has ever had, the freedom to decide and act in a manner that contradicts all his indicated decisions and deeds. What defines human nature is not the power of arbitrary decision and unpredictable action, but rather man’s ability to act in view of reason and motive and hence in accord with character. To define human freedom as the power to act arbitrarily would equate freedom with unrestrained, capricious and random action. [50]
B. It Is Inconsistent With the Justice of God
It is said that God is thus made a respecter of persons; however, it is not a question of who is or is not deserving. No one has any claim on God. There can be no partiality unless one has a claim on another. If God owed salvation and forgiveness to all and only chose som